The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) is to retrieve one message out of K messages replicated at N databases, without revealing the identity of the desired message to the databases. We consider the problem of PIR with colluding databases and eavesdroppers, named ETPIR. Specifically, any T out of N databases may collude, that is, they may communicate their interactions with the user to guess the identity of the requested message. An eavesdropper is curious to know the content of the messages and can tap in on the incoming and outgoing transmissions of any E databases with the user. The databases share some common randomness unknown to the eavesdropper and the user, and use the common randomness to generate the answers, such that the eavesdropper can learn no information about the K messages. The capacity is defined as the maximum retrieval rate, i.e. the number of information bits of the desired message retrieved per downloaded bit. In our previous work [1], we found that when E ≥ T , the capacity equals 1 − E N . In this work, we focus on the case when E ≤ T . We find an outer bound (converse bound) and an inner bound (achievability) on the optimal achievable rate. The gap between the derived inner and outer bounds vanishes as the number of messages K tends to infinity.
Abstract-The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) is to retrieve one message out of K messages replicated at N databases, without revealing the identity of the desired message to the databases. We consider the problem of PIR with colluding databases and eavesdroppers, named ETPIR. Specifically, any T out of N databases may collude, that is, they may communicate their interactions with the user to guess the identity of the requested message. An eavesdropper is curious to know the content of the messages and can tap in on the incoming and outgoing transmissions of any E databases with the user. The databases share some common randomness unknown to the eavesdropper and the user, and use the common randomness to generate the answers, such that the eavesdropper can learn no information about the K messages. The capacity is defined as the maximum retrieval rate, i.e. the number of information bits of the desired message retrieved per downloaded bit. In our previous work [1] , we found that when E ≥ T , the capacity equals 1 − E N . In this work, we focus on the case when E ≤ T . We find an outer bound (converse bound) and an inner bound (achievability) on the optimal achievable rate. The gap between the derived inner and outer bounds vanishes as the number of messages K tends to infinity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the situation where a user wants to retrieve a message from a remotely stored database, the nature of the data might be privacy-sensitive, for example medical records, stock prices etc., such that the user does not want to reveal the identity of the data retrieved. This is known as the problem of private information retrieval (PIR). In some cases, the privacy of the database needs also to be preserved. For example, if a user wants to retrieve his/her medical data from a database, it is hoped that the user obtains no information about other users' medical records. This is known as the problem of symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR).
The problem of PIR and SPIR was firstly studied in the computer science literature. In [2] , [3] , it is shown that if the messages are stored at a single database, the only possible scheme for the user is to download all the messages to guarantee information-theoretic privacy, which is inefficient in practice. It is further shown that the communication cost can be reduced in sublinear scale by replicating the messages at multiple non-colluding databases [3] . To further protect the privacy of the database such that the user obtains no information regarding the other messages besides the requested one, the problem of SPIR is introduced [4] . In [2] - [4] , the collection of messages stored at each database is modeled as a bit string, and the user wishes to retrieve a single bit. In these works, the communication cost is measured as the sum of the transmission at the querying phase from user to databases and at the downloading phase from databases to user.
When the message size is significantly large and the target is to minimize the communication cost of only the downloading phase, the metric of the downloading cost is defined as the number of bits downloaded per bit of the retrieved message, and the reciprocal of which is named the PIR capacity. A series of recent works derive information-theoretic limits of various versions of the PIR problem [5] - [11] etc. The leading work in the area is by Sun and Jafar [5] , where the authors find the capacity of the PIR problem. In subsequent works by Sun and Jafar [6] , [7] , the PIR capacity with colluding databases, and the SPIR capacity are derived. In [8] - [10] , Banawan and Ulukus find the capacity of the PIR problems with MDS-coded databases, with multi-message PIR, and with colluding and Byzantine databases. In our previous works [1] , [11] , [12] , we derive the capacity of the SPIR problem with MDS-coded databases, linear SPIR with colluding and coded databases, and the SPIR problem with Byzantine adversaries and eavesdroppers. Another series of works focus more on the coding structure of the storage system, and study schemes and information limits for various PIR problems with coded databases [13] - [17] .
In this work, we continue the study of the ETPIR problem when E ≤ T . We derive an outer bound (converse bound) on the optimal retrieval rate and common randomness (Theorem 2), and an achievable rate (inner bound) with a scheme designed (Theorem 3). In Section III, we discuss four special cases in which the capacity is known or can be easily derived, and reveal that our outer bound is tight for the four special cases. On the other hand, the inner bound is tight for three cases but one, namely, when E = T , the derived inner bound does not match with the capacity at this point. The gap between derived inner and outer bounds decays and vanishes as K tends to infinity. Note that in a more recent work [18] , the capacity of ETPIR is resolved.
II. MODEL A. Notation
Let [m : n] denote the set {m, m+1, . . . , n} for m ≤ n. For an index set I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n }, denote the set of variables {X i : i ∈ I} by X I . For a matrix S, let S[:, I] denote the submatrix of S comprised of the columns corresponding to the index set I. The transpose of matrix G is denoted by G T . Let ∼ denote the statistical equivalence between random variables, that is, if X ∼ Y , then X and Y are identically distributed.
B. Problem Description
Replicated databases: A collection of K independent messages (files), denoted by W 1 , . . . , W K , are replicatively stored at N databases (nodes). Each message consists L information bits. Therefore, for any k ∈ [1 : K],
User queries: A user wants to retrieve a message W κ with index κ from the database, where the desired message index κ follows some prior distribution among [1 : K]. Let U denote a random variable privately generated by the user, which represents the randomness of the query scheme followed by the user. The random variable U is generated independently of the messages and the desired file index. Let the realization of the file index κ be k, based on the realization of the desired file index k and the realization of U, the user generates and sends queries to all nodes, where the query received by node-n is denoted by Q
n ] n∈[1:N ],k∈[1:K] denote the complete query scheme, namely, all queries under all cases of desired message index. We have that H(Q|U) = 0. Common randomness: Let random variable S denote the common randomness shared by all databases, the realization of which is known to all the databases but unavailable to the user and the eavesdropper. The common randomness is utilized to protect the system-privacy (2) below, that is, to prevent the eavesdropper from learning the messages. Database answers: The databases generate answers according to the agreed scheme with the user based on the received query Q
n , the stored messages W [1:K] , and the common randomness S. The answer generated and sent to the user by node n is denoted by A
n . Eavesdropper: A passive eavesdropper can tap in on the incoming and outgoing transmissions of E nodes in the system. The eavesdropper is "nice but curious," in the sense that the goal of the eavesdropper is to obtain some information about the database, without corrupting any transmission. The user has no knowledge of the identity of the nodes tapped on by the eavesdropper.
T-EPIR: Based on the answers A [k]
[1:N ] and the query scheme Q, the user shall be able to decode the requested message W k with zero error. Any T databases may collude to guess the requested message index, by communicating their interactions with the user. Two privacy constraints must be satisfied:
User-privacy: any T colluding databases shall not be able to obtain any information regarding the identity of the requested message, i.e.,
System-privacy: For any set of databases E with size at most E, and for any k ∈ [1 : K]:
(2) Definition 1. The rate of a T-EPIR scheme is the number of information bits of the requested file retrieved per downloaded answer bit. By symmetry among all files, for any k ∈ [1 : K],
.
The optimal rate is denoted by R * T-EPIR . The capacity C T-EPIR is the supremum of R T-EPIR over all T-EPIR schemes.
Definition 2. The secrecy rate is the amount of common randomness shared by the storage nodes relative to the file size, that is
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we summarize the main results of this paper.
For T-EPIR with K files replicated at N databases, where any T nodes may collude and an eavesdropper can tap in on the communication of any E nodes, when E ≥ T , the capacity is
Remark: For the detailed proof of Theorem 1, we refer to Section V and Section VI.B of our previous work [1] .
For T-EPIR with K files replicated at N databases, where any T nodes may collude and an eavesdropper can tap in on the communication of any E nodes, when E ≤ T ,
The secrecy rate, i.e. the ratio of the amount of common randomness to the file size is at least
Remark: The proof of the outer bound is in Section IV. The outer bound is tight for the four special cases below.
Case 1 (E = T ): From Theorem 1, the capacity is
When there is no eavesdropper, i.e. E = 0, the problem reduce to the TPIR problem in [6] , where the authors derive the capacity to be C TPIR = The intuition is that, when the number of files increases, the penalty in the downloading rate to protect database-privacy for SPIR decays. When there are asymptotically infinitely many files, the information rate the user can learn about the database from finite downloaded symbols vanishes. When the number of files K tends to infinity, the outer bound tends N ) : When all databases collude, that is T = N , if furthermore E = T = N , the capacity is 0 because the eavesdropper receives the same information as the user. If the user can decode W k , so does the eavesdropper. Hence, the problem is non-trivial only if E is strictly smaller than T . Suppose each file consists L = N − E symbols from a large enough finite field F q , denoted by row vectors W The databases generate KE uniformly i.i.d. symbols from F q , denoted by K length-E row vectors S
Let G E×N be the generating matrix of an (N, E)-MDS code. The databases operate the (N, E)-MDS code on the common randomness vectors to obtain K length-N vectorsS
is a length-E zero vector, the user downloads A n k from database n for each file index k. It can be checked that the user can decode W k (in fact the user can decode all files), and both userprivacy and system-privacy are guaranteed. The rate achieved by the scheme is N −E N K . The outer bound in Theorem 2 is R T-EPIR =
when T = N , which is achieved by the scheme above. 
The amount of shared common randomness used in the achiev-
times the file size.
Remark: The inner bound is achieved by the scheme described in Section V. We discuss below the rate achieved by our scheme for the four special cases discussed above in which the outer bound in Theorem 2 is tight.
Case 1 (E = T ): The capacity of T-EPIR is C T-EPIR = 1 − E N = 1 − T N when E = T , that is, the rate of 1 − T N can be achieved by the scheme in our previous work [1] . When E = T , the rate achieved by the scheme in Section V is
which is strictly smaller than 1 − T N when T = N . Therefore, our scheme in Section V is not optimal when E = T . In other words, the inner bound in Theorem 3 is not tight for the case E = T . Case 2 (E = 0): When there is no eavesdropper hence E = 0, the rate achieved is R T-EPIR =
, which matches with the TPIR capacity derived in [6] , hence is optimal.
Case 3 (K → ∞): When the number of files K tends to infinity, lim K→∞ R T-EPIR = lim K→∞
Hence, the inner bound tends to the T-ESPIR capacity as K → ∞.
Case 4 (T = N ): When all databases collude hence T = N , the rate achieved by the scheme in this work is
, which matches the outer bound when T = N , hence is optimal.
In the full version [19] , we plot the results for several sets of parameters. It can be observed from the figures that when the number of messages K increases, the gap between the inner and outer bounds decays and vanishes as K → ∞.
IV. OUTER BOUND WHEN E ≤ T (THEOREM 2)
The proof for the cases K = 1 and K = 2 can be found in the full version [19] . In the following, the main steps of the proof for the general case where K ≥ 3 are presented.
For any set of nodes T ⊂ [1 : N ] with |T | = T and its compliment set T = [1 : N ] \ T , and for any k ∈ [2 : K],
where the last step follows by averaging over all T with size T and applying Han's inequality. 
where in (4), the message index of A T is omitted because from user-privacy, the answers of any T databases are independent of the message index. Similar as above, the last step follows by averaging over all T with size T and applying Han's inequality. Because A T is independent of the message index, we can set the index to be k in the last step. Therefore, from (3) and (5), for any k ∈ T ,. . .,A
[1:N ] |Q)+H(A [2] T , . . . , A
T |A T , W 1 , Q) + . . .
where (6) holds because from A T , A [1] T and Q one can decode W 1 . The last step is obtained by repeating the chain rule and by the fact that from A T , A 
T , . . . , A
[K]
T |A
≤H(A [1] [1:N ] |Q)+H(A [2] T |A T ,W 1 ,Q)+H(A [3] T |A T ,W 1 ,W 2 ,Q) + · · · + H(A T |A T ,W 1 ,Q)+H(A [3] T |A T ,W 1 ,W 2 ,Q) T |A T , W 1 , Q) + · · · + H(A
where (8) is due to system-privacy (2) . Equations (9)-(10) follows by repeating the chain rule and by the fact that from
T and Q one can decode W i for i = [1 : K − 1].
Step (11) follows by using inequality (7) for k = K. By iteratively using inequality (7) for k = {K − 1, K − 2, . . . , 2}, we obtain (12) . The last step follows by averaging over all E with size E and applying Han's inequality. Therefore,
To obtain a lower bound on the amount of common randomness needed to guarantee system-privacy, for any set of nodes E ⊂ [1 : N ] with size |E| = E,
where (13) holds because A E is a deterministic function of W [1:K] , S and Q. By averaging over all E with size E and applying Han's inequality,
In this section, we present an achievable scheme for the case E ≤ T . The scheme is modified from the TPIR scheme in [6] , by downloading K rounds where each round uses the scheme in [6] with a different part of the files and a different part of the common randomness generated by the databases. The three principles in [6] still apply in our scheme: 1) symmetry across databases; 2) symmetry of file indices within the queries to each database; 3) exploiting the side information of undesired files to retrieve the desired file information. The new ingredient of our scheme lies in iterating the scheme in K rounds to ensure each file is mixed with the common randomness in the same way, hence to fulfill principle 2. In the full version [19] , we present the details of the scheme for five examples and the general case. Due to the page limit, the scheme for general parameters of N, K, T, E is shown below.
Denote J = N K −T K N −T , and suppose each file comprises L = KN K − EJ symbols from a large enough finite field. The user downloads K rounds, with N J symbols per round. The database generates KEJ uniformly random symbols, denoted by S (r) [1:EJ] where r = [1 : K]. Divide [1 : L] and [1 : EJ] into K disjoint sets with sizes specified as below,
Note that |W i | + |S i | = N K . Therefore, W 
It is evident that G is invertible. In the following, we divide G into K pairs of matrices {G 
hence, the K index set pairs (W i , S i ) is rotated in all K round for each file index k ∈ [1 : K]. This is to assure user-privacy. The user privately generates K 2 matrices S For each round r, apply the scheme in [6] for V (r)
[1:K] as described in (15) . For any undesired file index k ∈ 
where the length of x For all K rounds r ∈ [1 : K], distribute the queries for each K evenly among the N databases, and the construction of the queries is completed.
The decodability, user-privacy, system-privacy, and the achievable rate of the scheme is shown in the full version [19] .
